China’s economy is languishing, and its worried leaders are pulling out all the stops.
They unveiled stimulus measures, provided rare cash subsidies, held a surprise meeting to kick-start economic growth and tried to shake up the struggling housing market with a series of decisions – they did it all last week.
On Monday, Xi Jinping himself spoke of “potential dangers” and being “fully prepared” to overcome severe challenges, which many assumed was a reference to the economy.
Less clear is how the economic slowdown is affecting ordinary Chinese people, whose expectations and frustrations are often subject to intense scrutiny.
But two new studies offer some insights. The first is a survey of Chinese people’s attitudes towards the economy, which found that people are increasingly pessimistic and disillusioned with their prospects. The second is a record of physical and online protest activity, showing an increase in incidents fueled by economic discontent.
Although far from complete, the picture provides a rare glimpse into the current economic situation and how Chinese people feel about the future.
In addition to the housing crisis, crippling public debt and rising unemployment have hit savings and spending. The world’s second-largest economy may miss its 5% growth target this year.
This is sobering for the Chinese Communist Party. Explosive growth has turned China into a global power, and stable prosperity is the carrot offered by an authoritarian regime that never lets up on the stick.
bullish to bleak
The economic slowdown emerged as the pandemic ended, driven in part by three years of sudden and sweeping lockdowns that stifled economic activity.
Research by Martin White, an American professor at Harvard University, and Scott Rozelle, a professor at the China Economic Center at Stanford University, shows that the contrast between the years before and after the epidemic is very obvious.
They conducted surveys in 2004 and 2009, before Xi Jinping became China’s leader, and in 2014 and 2023 during his time in power. Sample sizes varied, ranging from 3,000 to 7,500.
In 2004, nearly 60 percent of respondents said their family’s financial situation had improved over the past five years—and many of them were optimistic about the next five years.
In 2009 and 2014, this number increased significantly, with 72.4% and 76.5% respectively saying that the situation had improved, while 68.8% and 73% were hopeful about the future.
However, by 2023, only 38.8% believe that their family’s life has become better. Less than half (about 47%) believe the situation will improve over the next five years.
At the same time, the proportion of people who are pessimistic about the future has increased, from 2.3% in 2004 to 16% in 2023.
While the survey was based on a nationally representative sample of people aged 20 to 60, getting a broad range of opinions is a challenge in authoritarian China.
Respondents came from 29 provinces and administrative regions across China, but Xinjiang and parts of Tibet were excluded – Mr White said this was an “additional cost due to remote location and political sensitivity”. These ethnic minority areas in the northwest are tightly controlled and have long been under Beijing’s rule.
Researchers said people who were reluctant to speak their minds did not participate in the survey. Those who did share their views were told it was for academic purposes and would be kept confidential.
Their anxieties are reflected in the choices many young Chinese make. As unemployment rises, millions of college graduates are forced to take low-paying jobs while others are forced to take low-paying jobs. Adopt a “lay flat” attituderesisting tireless work. Someone else has Choose to be a “stay-at-home kid”returned to live with their parents because they couldn’t find a job or were exhausted.
Analysts believe China’s iron-fisted management of Covid-19 played a major role in dampening people’s optimism.
“[It] A turning point for many…it reminded everyone how authoritarian the country was. People feel they are being policed like never before,” said Alfred Wu, an associate professor at Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.
He added that many people were frustrated and the subsequent pay cuts “exacerbated the crisis of confidence”.
The 38-year-old Mossi is one of them. He quit his job as a psychiatrist and moved to the lakeside city of Dali in southwestern China, where he is now popular with young people who want a break from their high-pressure jobs.
“When I was a psychiatrist, I didn’t even have the time or energy to think about where my life was going,” he told the BBC. “There’s no room for optimism or pessimism. It’s just work.”
Does hard work pay off? Chinese people now say “no”
However, the survey shows that jobs no longer seem to portend a bright future.
In 2004, 2009 and 2014, more than 6 out of 10 respondents believed that “hard work will always pay off” in China. Those who disagree hover around 15%.
By 2023, the mood has shifted. Only 28.3% believe their efforts will be rewarded, while a third disagree. The divide is strongest among low-income households with annual incomes below 50,000 yuan ($6,989; £5,442).
Chinese are often told that time spent studying and pursuing a degree will lead to financial success. Part of the reason for this expectation is a turbulent history, with people gritting their teeth and plodding on through the pain of war and famine.
Chinese leaders also promote this work ethic. For example, Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream echoes the American Dream, in which hard work and talent are rewarded. He encouraged young people to “endure hardship”, and “endure hardship” means to endure hardship.
But in 2023, most respondents in White and Rozelle’s study believe people are wealthy because of the privileges their families and relationships provide. Ten years ago, respondents attributed wealth to ability, talent, a good education and hard work.
This is despite The “Common Prosperity” Policy signed by Xi Jinping It is aimed at narrowing the gap between rich and poor, although critics say it will only lead to a crackdown on business.
There are other signs of discontent, such as an 18% increase in protests in the second quarter of 2024 compared with the same period last year, according to China Dissent Monitor (CDM).
The study defines protest as any situation in which people express dissatisfaction or advance their interests in a way that conflicts with authority – this can happen in person or online. Such incidents, no matter how small, still occur in China. Even lone protesters are quickly tracked and detained.
Kevin Slaten, one of the four editors of the CDM study, said at least three-quarters of cases were driven by economic dissatisfaction.
Since June 2022, the organization has so far recorded nearly 6,400 such incidents.
They have seen an increase in protests against land grabs and low wages led by rural residents and blue-collar workers, but have also noted middle-class citizens organizing over the housing crisis. Across more than 370 cities, protests by homeowners and construction workers accounted for 44% of cases.
“This does not immediately mean that the Chinese economy is collapsing,” Slatten was quick to stress.
Still, he added, it was “difficult to predict” how such “dissent might accelerate” if the economy continues to deteriorate.
How worried is the Communist Party?
Chinese leaders are certainly worried.
August 2023 to January 2024, Beijing Stop publishing youth unemployment data after hitting an all-time high. Officials at one point coined the term “slow employment” to describe people who took their time looking for work — a separate category from the unemployed, they said.
Censorship agencies have been cracking down on any source of financial frustration – vocal online posts are swiftly deleted, while influencers are blocked on social media for flaunting their lavish tastes. State media defended the bans as part of efforts to create a “civilized, healthy and harmonious” environment. Perhaps even more shocking was last week’s report Top economist Zhu Hengpeng, Detained for criticizing Xi Jinping’s handling of the economy.
Slatten said the Communist Party seeks to control speech by “shaping the information that people can get or that is seen as negative.”
CDM’s research shows that despite high levels of state control, dissatisfaction has fueled protests – something that will worry Beijing.
November 2022, fatal fire – Caused at least 10 deaths Not allowed to leave the building during the COVID-19 lockdown, they brought thousands of people onto the streets in different parts of China to protest against the destruction of zero-COVID policies.
Professors White and Rozelle do not believe their findings indicate that “popular anger over… inequality may erupt in a volcano of social protest.”
But they wrote that the slowdown had begun to “undermine” the legitimacy the party had built through “decades of sustained economic growth and rising living standards.”
Zhou Yun, a sociology professor at the University of Michigan, said the epidemic still troubles many Chinese people. Beijing’s “harsh but erratic response” during the epidemic has exacerbated people’s insecurities about the future.
She added that this was particularly evident among marginalized groups, such as women trapped in a “highly discriminatory” labor market and rural residents who have long been excluded from welfare coverage.
below China’s controversial household registration system “hukou”urban migrant workers are not allowed to use public services, such as sending their children to public schools.
But young people like Mosi from the city are flocking to remote towns, attracted by low rents, picturesque scenery and greater freedom to pursue their dreams.
Mo Xixin was pleased to find that the pace of life in Dali was slower. “As the economy boomed, the number of patients who came to me for treatment of depression and anxiety was only going to increase,” he said, recalling his past work as a psychiatrist.
“There’s a big difference between China doing well and the Chinese doing well.”
About data
White, Rozelle and Aliski’s study is based on four sets of academic surveys conducted between 2004 and 2023.
In 2004, 2009 and 2014, we conducted fieldwork together with colleagues from the Research Center for Contemporary China (RCCC) at Peking University. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 70 years old and came from 29 provinces. Tibet and Xinjiang were excluded.
In 2023, the China Household Financial Survey Research Center (CHFS) of Southwestern University of Finance and Economics launched three rounds of online surveys at the end of the second, third and fourth quarters. The age range of participants was 20-60 years old.
All surveys used the same questions. To make responses comparable across four years, the researchers excluded participants aged 18-19 and 61-70 and reweighted all answers to make them nationally representative. All surveys have a margin of error.
The research has been accepted for publication by China Daily and is expected to be published in 2025.
Researchers at China Dissent Monitor (CDM) collected data on “dissent incidents” across China since June 2022 from a variety of non-governmental sources, including news reports, social media platforms operating in China, and civil society organizations.
A dissent incident is defined as a situation in which a person or persons use public and unofficial means to express dissatisfaction. Each event is highly visible and is also subject to government response or risk through repression or censorship.
These include viral social media posts, demonstrations, banner drops and strikes. Many incidents are difficult to independently verify.
Chart by Pilar Tomas from the BBC News data journalism team